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Economics and the Confederacy
Could it be that the strong central state of the twentieth century—praised by
some Americans and lampooned by others—had antecedents in, of all places, an
antebellum southern commercial agrarianism that eventually tried to destroy the
United States? In this well researched study of southern economic life and
reformers, John Majewski suggests that such an irony was in fact the case. In the
process this innovative book also helps debunk several others myths about the
southern economy and the Confederacy.
Working, literarily, from the ground up, Majewski shows how the region’s
acidic soil forced planters committed to staple crops to leave sizable tracts fallow
(sometimes for up to twenty years) before burning them to replenish the soil.
Though “shifting cultivation" made economic sense to planters and farmers, it
used only about one-third of their lands, compared to just over one-half of
northern farms. This environmentally-determined fact—traced through
Majewski’s careful analysis of census data—indelibly shaped the physical
landscape, economic potential, and even the political actions of the region’s
inhabitants. Population density, and by consequence consumer markets,
remained small and separated by acres of unproductive land. Cities were few and
far between. Commerce and manufacturing thus remained comparatively sparse
and railroads largely unprofitable. Frustration with the region’s languishing
economy, he argues, framed a reform-minded political agenda that aided the
secessionist effort and laid the groundwork for a powerful Confederate state.
Outside observers, especially those of an antislavery bent, saw slavery as the
chief culprit for comparatively less economic development. Most recent
historians have agreed. But Majewski’s data offers a more complicated story,
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showing that lands cultivated by slaves actually had higher rates of improvement
and suggesting that the institution may, at best, have been a secondary factor in
slower economic growth than the North. Furthermore, southerners certainly did
not perceive slavery as a weakness. Instead the region’s relative decline of
southern agriculture led reformers like Edmund Ruffin, James Hammond, and
others to urge better agricultural practice and especially the application of
marl—all in an effort to lessen the economic and political effects of shifting
cultivation. The Virginia and South Carolina reformers—and future
secessionists—who frame Majewski’s narrative were neither traditionalists nor
rustic agrarians. Rather, their missions to modernize the southern economy and
preserve slavery, mutually reinforcing in this account, led them down some quite
surprising paths, including most critically a steady drumbeat for “state" or
“government activism."
Though deeply practical in their goals and approach, intellectually
Majewski’s thinkers were essentially “neo-Hamiltonian" republicans (9) who
also anticipated the Progressive era’s concern with “mixing science and state
activism" (80). Here Modernizing a Slave Economy boldly challenges the
common assumption that southerners’ commitment to slavery and agricultural
led them to resist strong government. Instead, though admitting that few
southerners supported an active U.S. federal state, the author shows that
frustration with the limited reach of private efforts led reformers to urge state
governments to provide significant resources for agricultural surveys, to
subsidize agricultural journals and colleges, to use their regulatory powers and
the right of eminent domain, and most especially to construct railroads intended
to better tie internal economies together. The degree of success at the state and
local level varied markedly, generally hindered by intra-state jealousy and a lack
of private investment, but the reforming “ethos of collective action and
condemning excessive individualism" became deeply imbedded in the southern
mind. Reform-minded secessionists were not then libertarians but instead argued
that only collective action outside of the union could help end northern economic
and political dominance, thus allowing the South to fulfill its commercial
greatness. In short, “southern extremists" and “state activism" went hand in
hand" (56). Thus Majewski arrives at one of the books most important claims,
arguing that, contrary to the works of Emory Thomas and Richard Bensel, “the
strong Confederate state was not a radical disjuncture but a natural outgrowth of
southern attitudes, established during the antebellum period" and culminating in
secession" (7).
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During the war, however, “secessionists’ dreams quickly became a wartime
nightmare" (139) as ruling elites support for government activism grew into a
“Confederate Leviathan." “Perhaps," Majewski concludes, “the Confederates
lost the war not because their sense of nationalism was too weak, but because it
was too strong," leading to miscalculated policies that eventually undermined the
state (152). By dictating everything from the citizenry’s movement, to
commodity prices, to conscription, the Confederacy alienated groups within the
South, including upcountry yeoman farmers and most obviously slaves, whose
actions failed to support and in the later case severely hindered the war effort.
The argument is compelling, clearly presented, aided by a useful statistical
appendix, and precise. It joins a bevy of recent work that highlight the problem
of viewing the southern mind as perversely backward looking, demonstrating
instead that pragmatic problems more than rigid ideals defined political and
economic decisions. It also raises some interesting questions not fully explored.
Did individuals inhabiting the somewhat fresher and more abundant soils of the
Southwest fully share this state-centered view and if not what does that say about
secession and the Confederacy? What led some southerners (including many
Whigs and Unionists—especially in the Upper South—who presumably were
aware of these same problems) to continue to believe that the federal union
remained a useful entity, while reform-minded secessionists rejected that claim?
Finally, if the underlying economic reality was as bleak as secessionist reformers
(and it seems Majewski) argue, how could they seriously believe that the South
had the capacity to fight and win a war against such a superior North?
Most historians have answered this last question by assuming that they
jumped into it as an exercise in self-delusion, but such an interpretation would
not fit the framework presented here. Another, perhaps more likely scenario is
that the South’s economy had in fact advanced quite a bit in the previous decades
and that the broad swath of the southern population, including many
secessionists, retained more optimism than the political-motivated jeremiads of
reformers like Edmund Ruffin allowed. A purely North-South dichotomy
(though certainly influential) necessarily paints a lamentable picture of decline.
But new scholarship also suggests that when compared with other
contemporaneous economies in Europe and especially Asia, Africa, and South
America, (as planters whose chief competitors where overseas did), the southern
economies looks remarkably productive and even modern. This, high staple
prices in the 1850s—and some significant political victories at home and
abroad—might indicate that a significant amount of confidence worked
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alongside frustration to shape secession.
None of these questions, however, undermines the essential power of
Majewski’s path-breaking synthesis. Historians, political scientists, and the
public will continue to debate the precise origins of the modern central state, but
after this impressive work no one can safely write the South out of that
conversation or ignore the importance of the environment and interest in shaping
the region’s economic and political past.
Dr. Brian Schoen is Assistant Professor of History at Ohio University and
the author of The Fragile Fabric of Union: Cotton, Federal Politics, and the
Global Origins of the Civil War (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). He
is presently co-editing a volume for Oxford University Press, A New History of
the Old South intended for use by scholars and students.
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